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 The current competitive environment creates new imperatives in the Navy to sharpen our research skills and expand the range of methods we use to inves-
tigate questions about warfare and the Navy enterprise. The call to innovate has 
given rise to a number of very thoughtful critiques and suggestions.1 For example, 
there is renewed interest within the Navy in using wargaming, game theory, and 
experimentation to illuminate war-fighting challenges.2 However, none of these 
critiques or suggestions takes into consideration the nature of the research chal-
lenge or research standards.
Sometimes the use of particular research methods is promoted without under-
standing why analysts choose to use one method versus another or how to use each 
one most effectively to achieve particular objec-
tives.3 As many in the war-fighting research com-
munity are quick to point out, well-intended but 
overzealous analytical enthusiasms often lead to 
inefficient investment and disappointment, which 
inevitably generate critiques and calls for reform. 
In the worst case, a misguided analysis is used to 
support decisions that have tragic outcomes.
Innovating and expanding the range of methods 
we use to understand war fighting are a good idea—
provided they are informed by a clear understand-
ing of our objectives and research-performance 
criteria. However, in its review of joint profes-
sional military education research institutions, 
the Government Accountability Office concludes 
7308_Polski.indd   62 5/13/19   2:26 PM
1
Polski: Back to Basics—Research Design for the Operational Level of War
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
P O L S K I  6 3
BACK TO BASICS
Research Design for the Operational Level of War
Margaret M. Polski
that the Department of Defense (DoD) does not have criteria to assess research 
performance�4 The results of a 2017 workshop on the Navy’s operations research 
enterprise suggest that the Navy shares this challenge�5
The purpose of this article is to provide a starting point for addressing the 
military research-performance criteria gap by examining the nature of war 
fighting as a research challenge in the context of professional research standards 
and exploring how we could better assess, select, and evaluate methods�6 The 
first section analyzes the nature of war fighting as a research challenge and the 
implications for designing and evaluating research� The second section provides 
an overview of research design and the role of professional research standards in 
selecting methods and evaluating findings� The third and fourth sections analyze 
the strengths and limitations of wargaming, experimentation, and game theory 
against criteria that emerge from the analyses in sections 1 and 2� The final sec-
tion concludes by offering suggestions for improving our research practices�
THE NATURE OF THE RESEARCH CHALLENGE
With regard to analyzing warfare, the Navy (and the military more generally) 
has two challenges, which often are conflated� One challenge is to understand 
the nature of warfare as it evolves and how to fight, which informs the full range 
of the Title 10 concerns of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)� The other is 
to educate current and future warfighters, which primarily informs the CNO’s 
responsibility to organize, man, and train Navy forces�7
The first challenge involves ensuring that we design and conduct high-quality 
investigations that advance knowledge and inform everyday decision-making� 
The second is a pedagogical challenge that involves ensuring that our teaching 
methods achieve our learning objectives� If we wish to select the best methods for 
war-fighting research, we must be clear from the outset about the nature of the 
research challenge, which requires specifying the level of analysis, the nature or 
context of war fighting, and the questions we wish to investigate�
Specification
Joint doctrine provides a starting point for considering a broad range of military 
research questions at multiple levels of analysis� Figure 1 illustrates the levels of 
warfare� Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (JP 1) defines warfare 
as “the mechanism, method, or modality of armed conflict against an enemy� It 
is the ‘how’ of waging war�”8 While most of the Navy’s war-fighting challenges 
have implications at all levels of analysis, to craft a rigorous and coherent research 
design one must focus on a particular level of analysis� For the purpose of discus-
sion, this article narrows its analysis to one of the Navy’s three primary missions: 
how we can be ready to fight (and win) in a specific area of responsibility (AOR)� 
This is a research question at the operational level of warfare�
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One way to specify the operational level of war fighting in an AOR is as a 
series of strategic interactions. In this specification, the term strategic interaction 
does not pertain to the strategic level of warfare but rather to a type of behavior 
in which participants interacting in a system attempt to anticipate each other’s 
preferences, decisions, and actions/reactions; formulate perceptions and beliefs 
about the behavior of other participants, on the basis of available information or 
past experience; and make decisions about their own actions on the basis of their 
perceptions and beliefs about the other participants’ actions/reactions.
War fighting is a strategic interaction because two or more units are engaged 
in some form of rivalry, the scope of which may include a range of strategic 
behavior, from cooperation to competition to full-scale conflict. The focus of a 
research investigation is on some aspect of the behavior and effects of war fight-
ing: the decisions that warfighters make; the signals they produce; the processes 
and capabilities they employ; the effects of inputs to decision-making, such as 
information, beliefs, and incentives to act; the costs, benefits, risks, and effects of 
the choices that warfighters make; and so on.
The next step is to specify the context of operational-level war-fighting deci-
sion behavior. Many war-fighting behaviors emerge from a complex, adaptive 
system of physical and social systems. Complexity has a number of implications 
for designing and conducting research on strategic interaction.9 In operations 
research, decision-making challenges associated with complexity are called 
“wicked challenges.” Wicked challenges cannot be formulated definitively; they 
have neither a well-defined set of right-or-wrong solutions nor a well-described 
set of permissible operations; discrepancies can be explained in many different 
ways; and there is no immediate or ultimate test of a solution. While developing 
Battles











Source: Joint Publication 1.0, g. 1−2
FIGURE 1
LEVELS OF WARFARE
Source: U.S. Defense Dept., Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, fig. 1-2.
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war-fighting capabilities involves bench science, engineering, and social science, 
war fighting involves behavioral challenges that cannot be solved or addressed 
by science or probabilistic mathematics alone� This means that it is inherently 
a fuzzy rather than a formal logic challenge, which requires methods and tools 
that allow us to deal with vagueness and classification issues in a systematic and 
tractable way�10
If we wish to investigate decision-making questions at the operational level of 
warfare, we should employ research methods that are useful for analyzing strate-
gic decision behavior in complex adaptive systems� To do this, we need to specify 
what we mean by complexity, and its implications for research design�
Complex Adaptive Systems
Research questions that involve complicated systems, such as determining the 
range of a missile or a torpedo, may be complicated—but they are not wicked� 
They have knowable parameters and a small number of potential outcomes, and 
with the right set of methods one can generate estimates within a set of confi-
dence intervals� But questions related to decision-making in complex adaptive 
systems, such as deciding whether to launch a missile or a torpedo or where to 
target weapons, have fuzzy parameters and a potentially large number of alterna-
tive courses of action and outcomes� We may be able to observe patterns in the 
behaviors that emerge from complex adaptive systems, but we cannot eliminate 
the possibility that these patterns are transitory or extraneous� Hence, we may not 
be able to generate reliable estimates�
Similarly, we may find correlations in the behavior of components of complex 
adaptive systems, but it may not be possible to accumulate evidence that demon-
strates causal relations� For example, warfighters can and do change the nature 
of a rivalry by manipulating factors related to time, space, and force� Variables 
include the types of participants; functions and enablers, such as command 
and control, intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver, position, cyber, and other 
assets or capabilities in their AOR; the scope of permissible action and rules of 
engagement; the enforcement of rules; and the imposition of costs and benefits� 
Warfighters make decisions or take actions on the basis of an estimate of who or 
what their adversaries and allies are at any given point in time and what actions 
those adversaries and allies have taken or will take� Hence, to understand the 
behavior of one warfighter, one must understand the behavior of others within 
the relevant war-fighting environment, which may extend beyond the immedi-
ate AOR�
Behavior that emerges from complex adaptive systems can be differentiated 
from behavior in complicated systems in a number of ways� First, behavior is self-
organizing and exhibits both deliberate and spontaneous order� Self-organizing 
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behavior occurs without explicit command or control and depends on locally 
operating social and technical processes, which may be quite difficult to observe.
Second, the structure of complex adaptive behavior is distributed—or, more 
specifically, is polycentric—and it is multiscale. We can expect to find more than 
one center of decision-making and control, which means that a single, hierarchi-
cal form of command and control does not govern the system, even though some 
subsystems may be centralized or decentralized hierarchies. Multiscale behavior 
cannot be described by a single rule or analyzed at a single level; the structure of 
behavior exists on multiple scales and multiple levels.
Finally, while complex adaptive systems are sensitive to initial conditions, 
they often exhibit contradictory behavior. We may find path dependencies and 
stable equilibrium; however, these systems are ultimately dynamic, and we also 
can expect to find punctuated equilibrium, “black swans,” interdependencies, 
and nonlinearity.
It is extremely challenging to comprehend complex adaptive systems. If we 
wish to understand the behavior that emerges from these systems, we must be 
very careful in how we design and evaluate research.
RESEARCH DESIGN
As figure 2 shows, research design begins by specifying a purpose and objective(s) 
for the work. Objectives drive research design, which includes reviewing prior re-
search, then selecting approaches, methods, and tools to conduct research. The 
ultimate test of research findings is the extent to which they meet research objec-
tives, contribute to producing knowledge that is supported by facts and logical 




The Foundations of War-Fighting Research Design
FIGURE 2
THE FOUNDATIONS OF WAR-FIGHTING RESEARCH DESIGN
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The objective of operational-level war-fighting research may be to create or 
contribute to a body of basic research or applied research� For example, a basic-
research project on operational-level war fighting could involve trying to develop 
or test theories about enduring questions, such as why adversaries fight, how 
certain types of conflict end, or which signaling behaviors are associated with 
particular types of operations� Findings could contribute to advancing general 
knowledge about war fighting by providing evidence that either supports or does 
not support theories about the challenge�
By contrast, an applied-research project could involve identifying the func-
tions and enablers that are required to support an operational concept in a partic-
ular AOR under a specific set of conditions� It may or may not test theories about 
an operational challenge, but it could inform operational planning� The findings 
could help senior leaders and planners better understand the implications of 
using the operational concept that is being investigated in a specific context at a 
particular moment in time�
Once the objectives of research are determined, the principles that guide re-
search design and execution are quite similar� The overarching goal of research is 
to produce findings that have inferential value for other researchers, educators, 
and practitioners� However, this can pose a challenge for research design� Pro-
fessional research communities have expertise in research design� They impose 
stringent requirements for inferential value because society entrusts them to both 
build the stock of knowledge and guard the integrity of this stock� In contrast, 
practitioners might not have expertise in research design and they might accept 
less-stringent requirements for inferential value because they are not charged 
with building or guarding the stock of knowledge� Researchers must take these 
differences into consideration when they design research and share it with others�
War-fighting challenges cross disciplines, and research-design practices can 
vary across disciplines and research groups� For example, understanding the 
effects of hitting a target with a missile involves a grasp of knowledge that re-
searchers accumulate in physics, chemistry, material sciences, engineering, social 
sciences such as psychology and political economy, and so on� However, profes-
sional researchers, regardless of their disciplines, are trained to think about their 
work in the context of normal science and to use some version of the scientific 
method in the way they design and conduct their research�11 Table 1 lists the 
generally accepted steps in research design�
The aim of research design is to produce findings that will contribute to a 
stock of accumulated knowledge� This may involve testing an existing theory 
about a research challenge or developing a new theory� A peer-review process 
determines whether research findings will be added to the official stock� While 
peer reviews are notoriously idiosyncratic, the research communities do have 
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standard operating practices, which aim to assess and enforce rigor� Measures of 
rigor relate to validity, or the extent to which the way research is designed and 
carried out generates findings that actually measure what the researcher intended 
to measure; reliability, which refers to whether the researcher’s measuring proce-
dure, used in the same way, will produce the same measure; and replicability, or 
the extent to which another equally capable researcher could duplicate an analy-
sis using the same data and reach the same conclusions�12
Other professional research standards include taking steps to minimize bias 
and error in research procedures and ensuring, to the extent possible, that re-
search procedures are parsimonious (explaining as simply as possible, with as 
little extraneous detail as possible)� Finally, researchers are expected to be humble 
and to share their knowledge� All knowledge and all inference have limits; the 
best researchers are collegial skeptics who are able and willing to ask about the 
relevance of data, the appropriateness of research and analytical procedures, and 
the possibility of alternative explanations for inferences� They disseminate their 
research findings widely, in accessible ways, to stimulate and accelerate knowl-
edge production�
TABLE 1
STEPS IN PROFESSIONAL RESEARCH DESIGN
Notes:
a. Data may be quantitative (amounts or quantities, in the form of numbers or proportions) or qualitative (in the form of characteristics or qualities).
b. Mathematical, statistical, and machine-learning methods, which typically are called quantitative methods, require quantitative data. By contrast, qualita-
tive methods, such as histories, case studies, and interviews, rely on qualitative data.
Step Activity Issues/Questions
1 Specify an interesting purpose 
and objectives
What do we need to address to advance the stock of knowledge, such that 
it has broader impact?
2 Survey the scholarly and empiri-
cal research literature
What do we know about the issues associated with our purpose and 
objectives, and how strong is the evidence? That is, what are existing 
theories (i�e�, reasoned and logically consistent speculations about the 
answers to research questions) about our research challenge? What is the 
evidence that supports these theories? How extensive is the empirical 
support? How rigorous is the support? 
3 Formulate research questions 
as hypotheses and develop a 
detailed plan to investigate or 
test the degree of support for the 
hypotheses
Which data can we realistically collect to test theory?a How will we 
collect, structure, record, and archive the data we collect? How will we 
analyze data? Analytical questions focus on evaluating alternative testing 
methods to identify the one that best fits our research objectives and the 
type of data we are able to collect�b
4 Conduct the research How can we use data and conduct analyses to generate inferences that are 
unbiased by error? How can we increase leverage while minimizing the 
information used for description or inference?
5 Disseminate research results Research conducted to advance the stock of public knowledge is submit-
ted for peer review and published as widely as possible in scholarly and 
other public media� Research conducted to advance a private stock of 
knowledge also should be peer-reviewed and disseminated as widely as 
possible within the constraints of the research tasking�
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METHODS
Research design includes surveying research methods and selecting the one best 
suited to achieving research objectives� Recently the Navy research community 
has been reconsidering three methods to investigate questions about decisions 
and interactions in war fighting: wargaming, experimentation, and game theory� 
This section provides an overview of these methods, and the following section 
evaluates them against the criteria discussed in the preceding sections�
Wargaming
The Navy has employed wargaming as a method for investigating war fighting 
since at least 1887�13 The Navy’s use of wargaming has been shaped indelibly by 
the work of Captain William McCarty Little, Captain Wilbur R� Van Auken, and 
Francis McHugh� These early researchers developed wargaming at the Naval War 
College over a period that spanned the founding of the College, the interwar pe-
riod, and the Cold War era� McCarty Little is credited with introducing wargam-
ing into the Naval War College in 1887, and he wrote a number of papers on the 
subject�14 Van Auken was hired to stand up a research department at the College 
in 1932 to document and analyze wargame findings�15 However, it is McHugh 
who is associated most closely with developing the disciplined and systematic 
methodological approach to using wargames to analyze war fighting that the 
College’s War Gaming Department (NWC WGD) uses today�16
McHugh, incorporating McCarty Little’s work, defined wargaming as follows: 
“A war game is a simulation, in accordance with pre-determined rules, data, and 
procedures, of selected aspects of a conflict situation� It is an artificial—or more 
strictly, a theoretical—conflict � � � to afford a practice field for the acquirement of 
skill and experience in the conduct or direction of war, and an experimental and 
trial ground for the testing of strategic and tactical plans�”17
Today, the NWC WGD conducts wargames for the senior leadership of the 
Navy, primarily at the operational level of war in the context of great-power 
competition� Wargaming is a systematic method for experiencing the effects of 
war-fighting decisions and analyzing decision behavior� A wargame is a represen-
tation of a war-fighting decision-making dilemma—a representation that may or 
may not conform to what we can or will observe in the naturally occurring world� 
It is a representation of a real war fight, in the sense that players are actually play-
ing the game, and hence engaging in decision-making related to war fighting� 
Disciplined wargamers begin with a decision challenge, specify their research 
objective(s), and then design an experience that will illuminate the decision in 
such a way that they will achieve these objectives�18
In a typical wargame, players (individuals or groups with experience or re-
sponsibilities that are relevant to the decision challenge) are recruited to play the 
game in teams� Individuals who are not involved directly in playing the game act 
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as facilitators, adjudicators, data collectors, and analysts� Individuals are selected 
to participate on the basis of their expertise and understanding of the decision 
context� For example, if a researcher or research sponsor wishes to investigate 
the strengths and limitations of a concept of operations (CONOPS), the validity 
and reliability of the findings from game play depend to a great extent on how 
knowledgeable the participants are about the operating environment and the 
capabilities that the CONOPS requires them to employ� In other words, expe-
rienced warfighters should be asked to fight using the CONOPS and all their 
acquired knowledge and skill� Typically, none of the participants in a game is 
selected or assigned randomly�
Players and other participants are provided with scene setters, an environment 
in an operating area, and scenarios, which create a decision-making context and 
provide them with rules of engagement, resources, capabilities, and limitations� 
Games may be designed to represent conflict between two opposing units (two-
sided) or among multiple teams, which may be allied or opposed (multisided)�19 
The main point is that the game pits players against a rival or adversary� Partici-
pants may use computers in their play; manually manipulate assets and forces 
on a board; or deliberate, record, and convey their decisions in a seminar or 
workshop-style format�
Another group of participants controls the play of the game and adjudicates 
the effects of the decisions that players make� At the end of the game, players 
discuss the game experience, including the logic they used in playing the game, 
the challenges they encountered, and so on� Game play—including facilitation 
and after-action discussion—is observed and recorded by a data collection and 
analysis team� Following the conclusion of the game, the team organizes game-
play data; conducts analysis against a predetermined set of research questions, 
using qualitative and quantitative methods; reports on findings; and archives all 
game material�
The NWC WGD has a professional wargame research-design process that 
includes the steps that are typical in professional research design, which are 
modified to accommodate the Navy’s requirements for wargaming�20 The WGD’s 
current wargame-research process, which is depicted in figure 3, includes speci-
fying the challenge, purpose, and objectives of wargame research; conducting 
a literature review and articulating research questions; developing a research 
design that includes a data-collection and -analysis plan; designing and testing a 
game to achieve research objectives and address research questions; developing 
and testing the game; executing the game; conducting analysis; writing a report, 
which is peer-reviewed and disseminated to an approved audience; and archiving 
game artifacts� This disciplined process makes it possible to replicate the game, 
repeat the game, or iterate on some aspect of the game�21
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The fact that the NWC WGD has a professional wargame research-design 
process does not guarantee the quality or inferential value of its research prod-
ucts. As in any research enterprise, the research process may not be implemented 
perfectly at all times, researchers in the department may not always have the skills 
or tools they need at the time they need them to conduct rigorous research for 
particular challenges, and those who direct research tasking may wish to sacrifice 
analytical rigor to achieve other objectives.
NWC WGD wargaming research is conducted at classified levels and added 
to stocks of knowledge that the Navy and DoD maintain. The department’s 
wargames are peer-reviewed by other wargamers and decision analysts who are 
engaged in developing and evaluating war-fighting concepts and plans. Wargam-
ing is used in civilian research and learning and reported in publicly accessible 
scholarly research on conflict and decision behavior. There are many trade press 
publications on wargaming; however, few address it in the context of professional 
research criteria.
Experimentation
Most of us intuitively search for associations and causal relationships to explain 
and improve on our experience, and often we engage in a process of trial and er-
ror to arrive at a useful solution to a challenge. However, trial and error is a costly 
approach. The Navy has employed experimentation to identify a range of useful 
solutions to war-fighting challenges at the operational level of warfare.22 Formal 
experiments test the influence of one or a small number of causes of observed 
effects.23 Researchers articulate a specific theory of cause and effect, take an ac-
tion consistent with their theory (a treatment), attempt to control for extraneous 
influences that could limit or bias the hypothetical causal relationship, and sys-
tematically observe and record the effects of the manipulation.
Some analysts associate experimentation with the physical sciences and a 
tightly controlled laboratory environment. However, the experimental method 









Naval War College Wargame Research-Design Process
Source: Burns, ed., War Gamers’ Handbook
FIGURE 3
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE WARGAME RESEARCH-DESIGN PROCESS
Source: Burns, War Gamers’ Handbook.
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been developed over time to address variation in research challenges and ana-
lytical settings.24 Experiments and experimental frameworks are a well-described 
component of military operations research. Richard A. Kass, the Technical Coop-
eration Program (TTCP), and the Navy Warfare Development Center (NWDC) 
have published detailed, practical guides on war-fighting experimentation.25 All 
three of these guides categorize analytical wargaming as a type of experimental 
method. Experiments also are used in the social and computational sciences, 
which are the scholarly disciplines that address basic and applied decision- 
making challenges. Moreover, both wargaming and game-theoretic approaches 
can be used in combination with experimentation.26
All experiments consist of four elements: (1) units or persons, (2) treatments, 
(3) observations or outcomes, and (4) settings. Experiments are designed to 
understand a theory or hypothesis about a causal relationship among these ele-
ments. They answer the question: If we do x to y in a particular setting s, will z 
occur? Experimental design involves specifying and operationalizing proxies for 
x, y, s, and z and developing a set of protocols for organizing and running the 
experiment that will reduce bias and minimize threats to validity. Experimental 
protocols address the assignment of units or persons to experimental conditions, 
measurement of observations or outcomes, comparison groups, and treatment.
Kass, TTCP, and NWDC identify four requirements for a war-fighting experi-
ment to have inferential value.27 First, the experiment must provide the ability 
to use the hypothetical concept or capability. Second, the experimental environ-
ment must be structured in such a way that the experimentalist can observe an 
effect from using the hypothetical element. Third, the experimental environment 
and procedures must permit the experimentalist to isolate the reason for the 
observed effect. And finally, the experimental findings must relate to a real war-
fighting challenge.
Experimentation is an appealing approach to investigating war-fighting chal-
lenges because it has the potential to provide evidence about causal variables, 
which can be used to build knowledge about how to fight. The weakness of the 
approach is the extent to which causal inferences can be generalized beyond the 
experimental conditions to explain a broader class of similar war-fighting chal-
lenges. Generalization challenges in war-fighting experimentation are related to 
validity and they are intrinsic to the practical limits on designing and implement-
ing war-fighting experiments.
For example, most war-fighting challenges are necessarily local and particular. 
They occur in a restricted range of settings, which may or may not be replicable or 
repeatable, and with a particular version of one type of war-fighting “treatment” 
rather than all possible versions. Usually they have several different effective-
ness measures—each with theoretical assumptions that are different from those 
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associated with other measures—but not a complete set of all possible measures� 
Moreover, warfare often is conducted with a convenient sample of warfighters 
rather than one that reflects a well-described population, and it is conducted at 
a particular moment in time that soon becomes history� Each of these aspects of 
war fighting poses a challenge for using the findings from experimentation to 
answer general classes of war-fighting questions or challenges�
All research methods in the decision sciences and operations research have 
generalization issues� Yet we are not likely to abandon our quest to understand 
how things work in complex field settings or how we can improve the inferential 
value of our research findings� The mitigation strategies we use to address threats 
to validity depend on the type of validity challenge we confront� Kass, TTCP, and 
NWDC enumerate twenty-one threats to validity in war-fighting experiments 
and provide a catalog of techniques and procedures for improving validity�
Game Theory
Game theory is a mathematical approach to developing and testing theories of 
decision challenges that involve conflicts of interest� While it has been used to 
analyze strategic interactions that may occur in a war-fighting context, it is not 
per se a method for investigating war fighting or any other strategic interaction 
at an operational level� Martin J� Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein provide the fol-
lowing definition of game theory, games, and game-theoretic solutions� “Game 
theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help us understand the phenomena 
that we observe when decision-makers interact� � � � A game is a description of 
strategic interaction that includes the constraints on the actions that the players 
can take and the players’ interests, but does not specify the actions that the players 
do take� A solution is a systematic description of the outcomes that may emerge 
in a family of games�”28
One way to think about a game-theoretic analysis is as a systematic thought 
experiment that follows formal mathematical rules� It is an abstract representa-
tion of a particular interaction or class of interactions, which may or may not 
conform to real life� Decision makers do not play a game-theoretic analysis; a 
game theorist designs, “plays,” analyzes, and reports on the game� The game en-
vironment is an idealized choice context, “players” are mathematical operations, 
and the game does not provide the opportunity to engage in or experience the 
effects of decision-making�
The research-design process for a game theorist is focused principally on 
specifying an interesting decision challenge and assumptions about decision-
making, finding or developing an appropriate solution concept, and constructing 
a mathematical proof of the concept� The esoteric nature of the method dictates 
the research objective; it is an analytical exercise that is abstracted from a physical 
and social operating environment� While game theorists often motivate or impel 
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their models with a stylized description of a specific operational challenge, they 
aim deliberately for a sparse context so they can identify strategies that math-
ematically dominate other strategies for the interaction of interest� However, the 
product of the research—namely, the game-theoretic model—may be, and often 
is, tested empirically in richer environments using other research methods, such 
as experimentation and agent-based simulations� Empirical testing can offer the 
opportunity for greater specificity, as well as provide experience with the decision 
challenge�29
Game-theoretic assumptions about decision-making address the following 
aspects of the incentives and motivations of hypothetical decision makers: deci-
sions and the outcomes of decisions (e�g�, the payoffs or the costs/benefits as-
sociated with decisions); decision makers’ knowledge about alternative choices; 
their preferences for one decision over another, and the consistency of these 
preferences; their knowledge about the decisions that other decision makers will 
make, both preemptively and in response to their own choices; their beliefs or ex-
pectations about the likelihood of obtaining the payoffs associated with choices; 
the rules they use to make a decision; and the bases on which they update their 
knowledge about the state of play�
Game-theoretic analyses are based on a “rational” model of decision-making, 
in the sense that the analysis of decision makers’ incentives and motivations is 
based on the fundamental assumption that they are aware of their alternatives, 
form expectations about unknowns, have clear preferences, and make choices 
using some type of optimization process� Games can be designed to make the 
decision challenge more interesting by introducing uncertainty and incomplete 
or imperfect information� For example, a model may assume that players are un-
certain about the objective parameters of the environment, imperfectly informed 
about the events that unfold in a game, uncertain about the actions of other play-
ers, or uncertain about the reasoning of other players� However, rationality as-
sumptions are maintained in the face of uncertainty and are resolved by assuming 
that players determine the value of a choice on the basis of an estimated value of 
a utility function with respect to a probability measure�
COMPARING METHODS
Wargaming, experimentation, and game-theoretic modeling—all are used to 
analyze strategic decisions and interactions� However, they are very different 
methods and have different strengths and weaknesses for analyzing war-fighting 
decision challenges� Analysts using these methods to investigate war-fighting 
decisions approach research design in ways that have profoundly different impli-
cations for achieving the Navy’s research and education objectives� Table 2, which 
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provides a side-by-side comparison of wargaming, experimentation, and game 
theory against the standard measures of rigor discussed previously, shows that 
no method provides perfect rigor, and it highlights the trade-offs associated with 
using one method versus another�30 Game-theoretic modeling and experimenta-
tion have high internal validity, reliability, and replicability, but low external va-
lidity� This makes these methods good candidates for conducting rigorous basic 
research on the effects of war-fighting decisions under tightly constrained con-
ditions, but comparatively poor candidates for addressing research questions as-
sociated with less-constrained conditions, such as those associated with complex 
adaptive systems or the intensity and fog of war� In contrast, wargaming has high 
internal validity, reliability, and replicability, and its findings are more likely to be 
useful for addressing relatively unconstrained war-fighting decision questions�
The estimates of rigor associated with each method listed in table 2 are based 
on the potential of the method to generate findings in a rigorous way if research 
is designed and executed properly� However, the potential of a method to gener-
ate rigorous findings does not guarantee the quality or usefulness of the research; 
even the best researchers are not always able to meet standards for rigor, because 
they may not have the data, tools, facilities, or funds they need at the time they 
need them, or they may choose to sacrifice some analytical rigor to achieve other 
objectives�
Another way to look at methodological selection is through the lens of the 
purpose and objectives of research� Research purposes and objectives may in-
clude any of the following: 
• Advancing general knowledge about decision-making in war fighting
• Recognizing decision points in war fighting, so as to fight more effectively
• Providing warfighters with the opportunity to rehearse decision-making in a 
fight (e�g�, to prepare themselves to fight, without actually fighting)
• Educating current and future warfighters by providing experience in the art 
and science of decision-making in war fighting
Method Internal  Validity
External 
Validity Reliability Replicability
Wargaming High Medium High High
Experimentation High Low High High
Game theory High Low High High
TABLE 2
COMPARISON BASED ON MEASURES OF RIGOR 
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When we consider the nature of many war-fighting research questions and 
potential purposes and objectives, it suggests that we need a method that will 
accommodate both fuzzy and formal logic� As with any requirements analysis, if 
we are going to select a method properly to fit the nature of the war-fighting chal-
lenge and meet our purposes and objectives, we need a commonly understood 
criterion� In research requirements analysis, this criterion is inferential value, or 
the extent to which one can infer implications from research� However, inferen-
tial value is really a shorthand way of referring to two standard methodological 
selection criteria: the extent to which the selected method will generate analyti-
cally rigorous findings (i�e�, findings that are valid, reliable, and replicable) and 
the feasibility of operationalizing and executing the method�
Table 3, which compares our selected decision-analytical methods on the 
basis of four distinct purposes and objectives, shows that, once again, none of 
the methods meets all our potential requirements, although wargaming and 
experimentation meet most of them� Wargaming provides warfighters with an 
opportunity to think deeply about the use of an operating concept, an operat-
ing plan, or a course of action, or to experience decision-making and the effects 
of interaction with a determined adversary, whereas experimentation provides 
researchers a means to analyze alternative concepts and capabilities empiri-
cally� However, wargaming and experimentation are not the best candidates for 
research that aims to advance general knowledge of warfare� Yet while game- 
theoretic modeling is a strong method for obtaining rigorous insights into gen-
eral classes of tightly constrained decision questions, it has limited use for ad-
dressing the kinds of decisions and decision environments that are typical in joint 
warfare and combined arms� As Thomas C� Schelling observed when the military 
reinvigorated mathematical modeling and simulation to address war-fighting 
decisions in the Cold War era, when humans are in the loop it is impossible to 
sustain rigid parameters; we can and do change the rules of the game as we play 
and, more importantly, as we fight�31
Objectives Wargaming Experimentation Game Theory
Advance general knowledge of warfare Weak Weak Strong
Recognize decision points Strong Strong Weak
Rehearse decisions Strong Strong Weak
Experience decisions Strong Strong Weak
TABLE 3
COMPARISON BASED ON PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES
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Researchers understand that no method ever will allow them to achieve 
perfect inference or analytical rigor—these are ideal standards, not minimum 
thresholds� They also understand that their most interesting challenges, such as 
fighting peer and near-peer adversaries in a global political and economic system 
with four physical domains, are messy and difficult to investigate� This implies 
that we must reconcile ourselves to trading some degree of inferential value and 
rigor to make progress� For example, it may be difficult to find data that will 
measure what we would like to measure, data may be difficult to clean for analy-
sis because it is incomplete or corrupted, it may be difficult to mitigate bias in 
data collection and analysis, we may not understand or be able to agree on how 
to measure or interpret data, and we may not have the analytical capabilities or 
tools we would like to have�
Wargaming, experimentation, and game theory have different but potentially 
complementary strengths for investigating questions about war fighting at the 
operational level� Wargaming is a research process that provides the opportunity 
to experience and think through the implications of operational decisions and 
to identify gaps and shortfalls in potential war-fighting operations� Similarly, ex-
perimentation is a disciplined and systematic investigatory process for isolating 
and identifying associations and causal relationships among a range of variables� 
When used to investigate war fighting, it may produce a range of useful find-
ings with a relatively high degree of inferential value� Game theory can serve 
both wargaming and experimentation by providing a framework for specifying 
the structure of decision makers’ incentives and motivations in a potential war-
fighting operation, which is useful in designing, implementing, and interpreting 
research findings�
However, when used on a stand-alone basis, wargaming, experimentation, 
and game theory all have serious limitations as research methods for improving 
the useful stock of knowledge about war fighting at the operational level� Each 
method may produce biased results that can affect the validity and reliability of 
findings� The technique most often recommended to strengthen the validity of a 
research design is to use formal probability sampling of instances of units, treat-
ments, observations, or settings� However, implementing this approach requires 
both the existence of clearly delineated populations of each of these variables and 
the ability to sample with known probability from within each of these popula-
tions� Even if this were possible in critical war-fighting research areas, formal 
sampling methods usually offer only a limited solution to generalization issues�
TTCP suggests an alternative approach to improving the inferential value of 
war-fighting research� It recommends using multiple research methods, inte-
grating methods into a coherent and concerted research program, and using an 
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iterative process of analysis.32 The Navy has an ongoing experiment that applies 
this approach to exploring critical war-fighting decision issues.33 Beginning in 
late 2014, the Navy began experimenting with integrating a number of different 
research methods to explore the challenges associated with potential war-fighting 
scenarios in the Pacific Fleet AOR. Figure 4 illustrates the Navy’s perspective on 
integrated research. The aim of the project (still ongoing, on a classified basis) is 
to develop concrete recommendations that can inform decisions about strategy, 
concepts of operations, mission analyses, operation planning, campaign analy-
ses, and resource allocation. The sponsor for the project is the fleet commander. 
The analytical team includes the CNO’s strategy and planning staff (N3/N5), his 
campaign analysis staff (N81), the fleet’s war-fighting assessments and readiness 
staff (N9), and the NWC WGD.
Naval analysts are using the insights they have obtained from this research 
program to inform ongoing modeling, simulation, development of CONOPSs, 
mission analyses, and strategic thinking; to refine analytical agendas; and to 
conduct further research. The team that originally organized and directed this 
program of research characterized it as an innovation in decision analysis that has 






An Integrated Program for Operational War-Fighting Research
Source: Rear Adm. Patrick Piercey [USN] and David Yoshihara
FIGURE 4
AN INTEGRATED PROGRAM FOR OPERATIONAL WAR-FIGHTING RESEARCH
Source: Rear Adm. Patrick Piercey, USN, and David Yoshihara.
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value of linking and more tightly integrating operations analysis and research and 
of basing operational and command decisions on findings that rely on multiple 
research methods�
The team has offered the following recommendations, which have implica-
tions for designing and conducting research, education, and training�34
1� Begin with the end(s) in mind. Use a structured, systems approach to 
identify opportunities to achieve actionable results, specify the context 
for decision-making, generate objectives, and outline requirements� If 
integrative analysis is something new in an organization, create a Skunk 
Works, provide top cover, and communicate strategically�
2� Keep it simple. Research is time-consuming and costly; resist the tendency 
to overspecify requirements, to focus on tools and technologies rather 
than decisions and insights, and to include too many people� Do not be 
afraid to slow things down to avoid “rushing off to failure�”
3� Facilitate collaboration� Build the infrastructure for collaboration into the 
research design and integration process, and ensure that there is openness 
and transparency among all associated staff members�
4� Understand what is required and delivered. The commander and analytical 
staff need to have a good understanding of research methodologies and of 
what is reasonably achievable� Manage expectations about the inferential 
value of the research and how component projects will align within the 
larger research program�
Professional research communities are rife with—and often thrive on— 
controversy and professional jealousies� However, if senior Navy leaders wish to 
optimize returns on investment in operations research, it would behoove them 
to focus on the inferential value of research findings, be wary of provoking un-
productive turf wars, and eschew searches for silver bullets and all-encompassing 
methods� Researching complex system-of-system challenges such as war fighting 
requires multiple methods, integrated research programs, and strict account-
ability to research criteria related to inference, intellectual merit, and broader 
impacts�
There is no single operations research method that is demonstrably better 
than any other method for advancing knowledge of operational-level warfare� 
Every method has strengths and limitations in producing findings that can help 
the Navy make decisions that will protect and successfully prosecute U�S� inter-
ests over the short, medium, and long terms�
To grapple more effectively with complexity and rapidly changing threat 
environments, we need wargames and we need more, not less, senior leader 
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engagement in these games� But these games must be designed and conducted 
with an experimental mindset, integrated within a broader research program, 
and informed by professional research practice, and researchers must be willing 
to take on board advances in science, mathematics, and technologies� We can use 
game theory to inform and refine operations research practices, but we cannot 
use it to analyze contemporary or future policy, strategy, operational design, or 
tactical challenges�
The history of the U�S� Navy is replete with examples of innovation in warfare 
at the operational level� If senior leaders wish to innovate, they must focus their 
attention and efforts on ensuring that decision-making in the Navy enterprise 
is based on professionally vetted research, then hold the research enterprise to 
these standards�
N O T E S
 1� The call to innovate in the Department of 
Defense began with Deputy Secretary Robert 
O� Work’s memorandum dated February 
9, 2015, available at news�usni�org/� In the 
Navy, Secretary Ray Mabus issued a call to 
innovate with his memorandum dated May 5, 
2015, available at www�doncio�navy�mil/� For 
reflections on the implications for research at 
the Naval War College, see Thomas J� Culora, 
“A War-Gaming Renaissance,” U�S� Naval 
Institute Proceedings 142/5/1,359 (May 2016)� 
Similarly, see John Hanley’s call for change 
in analysis and research in John T� Hanley Jr�, 
“Changing DoD’s Analysis Paradigm: The 
Science of War Gaming and Combat/Cam-
paign Simulation,” Naval War College Review 
70, no� 1 (Winter 2017), pp� 64–103� Chief 
of Naval Operations Admiral John Richard-
son has emphasized the role of analysis and 
research� John Richardson [Adm� USN], “A 
Design for Maintaining Maritime Superior-
ity Version 2�0,” December 2018, available at 
www�navy�mil/�
 2� Hanley proposes that we use game theory 
to enhance operational wargaming prac-
tice� John T� Hanley Jr�, “Planning for the 
Kamikazes: Toward a Theory and Practice 
of Repeated Operational Games,” Naval War 
College Review 70, no� 2 (Spring 2017), pp� 
29–48�
 3� With respect to wargaming, see, for example, 
Hank J� Brightman and Melissa K� Dewey, 
“Trends in Modern War Gaming: The Art of 
Conversation,” Naval War College Review 67, 
no� 1 (Winter 2014), pp� 17–30, and Culora, 
“A War-Gaming Renaissance�” With respect 
to game theory, see Thomas C� Schelling, The 
Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Univ� Press, 1960)� For a more recent critique, 
see, for example, Ariel Rubinstein, “Com-
ments on Economic Models, Economics and 
Economists: Remarks on Economics Rules by 
Dani Rodrik,” Journal of Economic Literature 
55, no� 1 (March 2017), pp� 162–72�
 4� Government Accountability Office, Joint 
Professional Military Education: Opportunities 
Exist for Greater Oversight and Coordination 
of Associated Research Institutions, GAO-14-
216 (Washington, DC: March 2014)�
 5� See Jon Scott Logel and Margaret M� Polski, 
2017 Navy Operations Analysis and Research 
Workshop Final Report (Newport, RI: U�S� 
Naval War College, December 29, 2017)�
 6� Substantial portions of this article are based 
on Margaret M� Polski, “A Warfighter’s Guide 
to Analysis” (working paper WGD20181, War 
Gaming Department, U�S� Naval War College, 
Newport, RI, April 2018), and Margaret M� 
Polski and Jon Scott Logel, “Doing Analysis” 
(working paper WGD20191, War Gaming 
Department, U�S� Naval War College, New-
port, RI, January 2019)�
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 7� The Chief of Naval Operations and the other 
service chiefs are charged under Title 10 of 
the U�S� Code with providing policy advice; 
organizing, manning, training, and equipping 
the force; providing guidance for the develop-
ment of doctrine, concepts, courses of action, 
and standard operating policies and proce-
dures; budgeting, research and development, 
and capital investment; and building strategic 
partnerships�
 8� U�S� Defense Dept�, Doctrine for the Armed 
Forces of the United States, JP 1 (Washington, 
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013, 
incorporating change 1 of July 12, 2017), p� 
I�A(3)�
 9� The following sections are drawn from 
Margaret M� Polski, “Extending the Institu-
tional Analysis and Development Framework 
to Policy Analysis and Design,” chap� 2 in 
Institutional Diversity in Self-governing Socie-
ties, ed� Filippo Sabetti and Dario Castiglione 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017), pp� 
25–47�
 10� Fuzzy logic is a means of classifying objects 
or concepts that are inherently vague or dif-
ficult to categorize as either true or false� The 
modern fuzzy logic concept and fuzzy logic 
set theory are attributed to Lotfi A� Zahdeh� 
For an accessible account of fuzzy logic, see 
Daniel McNeill and Paul Freiberger, Fuzzy 
Logic: The Revolutionary Computer Technol-
ogy That Is Changing Our World (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1993)�
 11� Classic texts on the philosophy of science 
include Karl R� Popper, The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, Routledge Classics (Abingdon, 
U�K�: Routledge, 2002), and Thomas S� Kuhn, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chi-
cago: Univ� of Chicago Press, 1962)� For an 
interesting analysis from a sociological per-
spective, see Randall Collins, The Sociology of 
Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual 
Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ� 
Press, 1998)�
 12� These definitions of validity, reliability, and 
replicability are drawn from Gary King, Rob-
ert O� Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing 
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualita-
tive Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ� 
Press, 1994)� Donald Campbell and Julian 
Stanley, who are concerned with experimen-
tal design, distinguish internal validity from 
external validity� Findings have internal valid-
ity if we can state that the experimental treat-
ment made a difference in a specific experi-
mental instance� External validity refers to the 
extent to which findings can be generalized 
across other populations, settings, treatment 
variables, and measurement variables� Donald 
T� Campbell and Julian C� Stanley, Experi-
mental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for 
Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963)� 
For a general primer on research design and 
planning, see Paul D� Leedy and Jeanne Ellis 
Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning and 
Design, 9th ed� (Harlow, Essex, U�K�: Pearson, 
2010)�
 13� The proper spelling of wargaming is contro-
versial� In McCarty Little’s and McHugh’s 
published writings, the term was rendered as 
war gaming (i�e�, open)� Today, however, other 
than in the name of the War Gaming Depart-
ment, the College uses the wargame/-er/-ing 
spelling (i�e�, closed up)�
 14� McCarty Little was appointed in 1887 as a 
member of the faculty and developed two-
sided wargaming at the College� Brightman 
and Dewey, “Trends in Modern War Gam-
ing�” McHugh also credits McCarty Little 
with introducing wargaming at the College� 
See Francis J� McHugh, Fundamentals of War 
Gaming, 3rd ed� (Newport, RI: U�S� Naval 
War College, 1966)� McCarty Little’s publica-
tions on wargaming include Rules for the 
Conduct of War Games (Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, 1901, 1905), “The Strategic 
Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver,” U�S� 
Naval Institute Proceedings 38/4/144 (1912), 
and The Chart Maneuver (Newport, RI: Naval 
War College, 1920)�
 15� Jon Scott Logel reports on Van Auken’s 
appointment as director of the Research De-
partment at the College and his team’s work 
analyzing wargames in the interwar period� 
See Jon Scott Logel, “Captain Van Auken 
and the Research Department of the Naval 
War College: Considerations of Analytical 
War Gaming in the Decade before Midway” 
(paper prepared for the 2017 McMullen  
Naval History Symposium, U�S� Naval 
Academy, Annapolis, MD, September 14–15, 
2017)� Also see John M� Lillard, Playing War: 
Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for 
World War II (Lincoln: Univ� of Nebraska 
Press, 2016), p� 100�
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 16� McHugh’s influence is reflected in the current 
edition of the College’s reference work on 
the subject� Shawn Burns, ed�, War Gam-
ers’ Handbook: A Guide for Professional 
War Gamers (Newport, RI: U�S� Naval War 
College, [2015]), available at usnwc�edu/� 
For a professional wargamer’s perspective on 
McHugh’s influence, see David DellaVolpe’s 
foreword�
 17� McHugh, Fundamentals of War Gaming�
 18� For detailed descriptions of wargaming meth-
odology, see ibid�, and Burns, War Gamers’ 
Handbook�
 19� Wargamers have different ways of categoriz-
ing the structure of their wargames� Common 
categories are one-sided, one-and-one-half-
sided, two-sided, multisided, and red  
teaming�
 20� See Burns, War Gamers’ Handbook, for a 
description of the process�
 21� By replicate I mean that another equally 
capable research team could analyze the data 
from game play and obtain the same findings� 
By repeat I mean that the same game design 
could be played again by another research 
team or the same research team with the same 
players or another group of players� By iterate 
I mean that a new game could be designed 
and played that builds on previous findings to 
extend the investigation of the war-fighting 
challenge�
 22� The Navy Warfare Development Command 
(NWDC) manages and executes the Fleet 
Experimentation program on behalf of Com-
mander, U�S� Fleet Forces Command and 
Commander, U�S� Pacific Fleet� For informa-
tion, see “Navy Warfare Development Com-
mand,” America’s Navy, www�navy�mil/�
 23� The following section draws on M� M� Polski, 
“Technical Brief on Quasi-Experimental 
Design” (paper prepared for the WG 30 Special 
Session, “Are War Games Quasi-Experiments?,” 
of the Military Operations Research Society’s 
83rd Symposium, Alexandria, VA, June 23, 
2015)�
 24� William Shadish, Thomas Cook, and Donald 
Campbell identify five different types of 
experiments: an experiment, a randomized 
experiment, a quasi experiment, a natural 
experiment, and a correlational study� They 
also provide examples of the use of the 
experimental method across disciplines� 
See William R� Shadish, Thomas D� Cook, 
and Donald T� Campbell, Experimental and 
Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized 
Causal Inference (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
2001)�
 25� See Richard A� Kass, The Logic of Warfight-
ing Experiments, Command and Control 
Research Program Publication Series (Wash-
ington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense, 2006); the Technical Coopera-
tion Program [hereafter TTCP], Guide for 
Understanding and Implementing Defense 
Experimentation [hereafter GUIDEx], ver� 1�1 
(Ottowa: Canadian Forces Experimentation 
Centre, February 2006); and NWDC, Experi-
ment Planning Guide [hereafter EPG], 2017 
ed�
 26� See, for example, Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gard-
ner, and James Walker, Rules, Games, and 
Common-Pool Resources (Ann Arbor: Univ� 
of Michigan Press, 1994); John H� Kagel and 
Alvin E� Roth, eds�, The Handbook of Experi-
mental Economics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Univ� Press, 1995); Nigel Gilbert and Klaus G� 
Troitzsch, Simulation for the Social Scien-
tist, 2nd ed� (New York: Open Univ� Press, 
2010); John T� Cacioppo, Penny S� Visser, and 
Cynthia L� Pickett, eds�, Social Neuroscience: 
People Thinking about Thinking People (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT, 2006); and Dietrich Dörner, 
The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding 
Error in Complex Situations (New York: Basic 
Books, 1997)� Many empirical social scientists 
conceptualize decision challenges using game 
theory, then test these game-theoretic models 
using experimental methods�
 27� Kass, The Logic of Warfighting Experiments; 
TTCP, GUIDEx; NWDC, EPG.
 28� Martin J� Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A 
Course in Game Theory (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1994); John von Neumann, “Zur 
Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele,” Mathe-
matische Annalen 100 (1928), pp� 295–320; 
John von Neumann, “Über ein ökonomisches 
Gleichungssystem und eine Verallgemeine-
rung des Brouwerschen Fixpunktsatzes,” 
Ergebnisse eines mathematischen Kolloquiums 
8 (1937), pp� 73–83; John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton Univ� Press, 1944)� In addition to von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, classic texts 
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include R� Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, 
Games and Decisions: Introduction and 
Critical Survey (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1957); 
Martin Shubik, Game Theory in the Social 
Sciences: Concepts and Solutions (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1982); Hervé Moulin, Game 
Theory for the Social Sciences (New York: New 
York Univ� Press, 1986); Drew Fudenberg and 
Jean Tirole, Game Theory (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1991); Roger B� Myerson, Game 
Theory: Analysis of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Univ� Press, 1991); and Kenneth G� 
Binmore, Fun and Games: A Text on Game 
Theory (Lexington, MA: D� C� Heath, 1992)�
 29� Game-theoretic analyses are used extensively 
in institutional political economy, experi-
mental economics, and computational social 
science� See, for example, Ostrom, Gardner, 
and Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool 
Resources; Kagel and Roth, The Handbook 
of Experimental Economics; Robert H� Bates 
et al�, Analytic Narratives (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ� Press, 1998); and Gilbert and 
Troitzsch, Simulation for the Social Scientist�
 30� For an alternative but complementary ap-
proach to analyzing and comparing methods, 
see Paul K� Davis, Analysis to Inform Defense 
Planning despite Austerity (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2014), and Paul K� Davis and 
Amy Henninger, Analysis, Analysis Practices, 
and Implications for Modeling and Simulation 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007)�
 31� For an early critique of game-theoretic analy-
ses, see Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 
chap� 4� Also see Thomas C� Schelling, 
“The Role of War Games and Exercises,” in 
Managing Nuclear Operations, ed� Ashton B� 
Carter, John D� Steinbruner, and Charles A� 
Zraket (Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1987), and Thomas C� Schelling, “Red 
vs� Blue” (paper presented at a wargaming 
conference organized by the National Defense 
Univ� at U�S� Marine Headquarters, Quantico, 
VA, August 2015)� Schelling is often—and 
wrongly—described as a game theorist� In a 
conversation with him in September 2014, I 
asked about this identification� He told me 
that he had never worked with game theory, 
but that he thought some of its organizing 
ideas were useful for thinking systematically 
about strategic interaction�
 32� TTCP, GUIDEx contains fourteen principles 
for designing defense research; five of them 
(nos� 4–7 and 10) are related to integrating 
and leveraging multiple operations research 
methods�
 33� This section is based on Margaret M� Polski, 
“The Navy’s Experience with Integrative 
Decision Analysis” (unclassified case 
study prepared for the Military Operations 
Research Society wargaming community of 
practice) and classified cross-game studies 
the author conducted in July 2017, December 
2017, August 2018, and November 2018 for 
the CNO�
 34� Polski, “The Navy’s Experience wth Integra-
tive Decision Analysis�”
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